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ABSTRACT 
A large literature is present on how colonial origins through the channels of Institutions and 
human capital explain the income variation between countries. In most cases, it is argued that 
colonial European settlement outside of Europe has shaped the type of institutions present 
today that explain the gap between income levels of countries. Others criticize this claim on 
the basis that firstly, geography plays a prominent role in income variation and secondly, the 
studies in favor of the primacy of the role of institutions suffer from measurement error and 
bias. In this study, we analyze the role colonial origins and geography play in comparative 
income levels of countries today. In this study, we present a theoretical analysis for what 
determines growth in the long run and how colonial origins come into play and then make an 
empirical study using OLS and IV techniques, while utilizing recent data and different 
proxies, into the claims that colonial origins and/or geography play the prominent role. We 
also investigate whether the institutions primacy studies suffer from measurement error.  Our 
findings point out that while geography may play a small role, majority of the income 
variation is associated with institutions and colonial origins. 
JEL Codes: P51, P16, I12, N10, O57, O1, O4, O11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, numerous empirical studies have taken place to investigate why some 
countries are poor and others are rich. One of the most prominent of these studies, Acemoglu 
et al
1
 (from now on referred to as AJR) concentrate on the role European colonial origins play 
in determining income variation across countries. These studies argue that when Europeans 
colonized different areas of the world, they set up two types of institutions - extractive or 
inclusive- as well as taking with them skills, technology and culture that persisted over time. 
Thus, these European extorts across the globe could be the main explanation as to why we 
have differences in income between countries. On institutions, it is argued that where 
colonialists set up inclusive institutions, ones where the rights to life, liberty and property 
were guaranteed, growth followed and this persisted over the years creating a gap in income 
levels. However, there are papers that criticize this claim and find geography to be as 
important in determining growth and income levels. Furthermore, because the studies use 
Instrumental variables techniques to study the role of European colonial origins on income 
levels today, they are criticized on the strength and validity of their instruments. In this paper, 
we look into the role colonial origins play in determining income levels today. In the first 
section of the paper, we review the prominent literature on the topic. In the second section, 
we present a theoretical analysis for what determines growth in the long run and how colonial 
origins come into play. In the third section we take up an empirical enquiry using OLS and 
IV techniques, while utilizing recent data and different proxies, into the claims and criticism 
of whether colonial origins plays the prominent role. Lastly, we conclude our paper with a 
brief answer to whether the findings of AJR stands the critiques of Albouy (2004, 2006, 
2012), the critique of Sachs (2003) and the test of time – given different proxies and up to 
date data. 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In this section, we provide a brief review of the current empirical literature that supports the 
view that colonial origin through different channels play the determining role in growth. We 
first look at the first and most prominent channel, institutions, through which colonial origin 
affects growth differences. We then present the evidence against the primacy of institutions, 
discuss other channels such as human capital as well as some of the shortcomings and 
criticisms of the established papers on the topic. To this date, the most influential studies on 
institutions and growth address the reverse causality and the endogeneity issues by employing 
instrumental variable regressions. Based on the fact that institutions persist over long periods 
of time, the settlement decisions of colonizers and imperial powers between the 16
th
 and 19
th
 
century can be used as econometric leverage to help unravel the real causal relationship 
between institutions and growth. 
One of the first papers in this field is Hall and Jones (1999) who instrument the quality of 
current institutions, which they call ―social infrastructure‖, with geographical and linguistic 
characteristics of the colonies in the 16
th
 century: distance from the equator and the extent to 
which English and other European languages are spoken as a mother tongue. The authors 
argue that Western Europe was one of the first regions in the world to set up the social 
infrastructure conducive to high output growth. As such, it can be argued that regions where a 
larger proportion of the population who spoke these languages is correlated with Western 
influence, and thus early institutions. Their empirical results show that countries with the best 
institutions enjoy 25 to 38 times higher income per worker than countries with the worst 
institutions.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) criticize Hall and Jones‘ paper on the basis that their instruments do 
not represent the true causal effect of institutions on growth, as they are directly correlated 
with economic performance. They propose a new instrument, European settler mortality, 
which they argue was a crucial determinant of early colonial settlement experience which in 
turn led to differences in current institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality 
rates, they preferred to set up extractive institutions (Congo, Burundi, Mexico); whereas in 
places where they faced low mortality rates, they set up inclusive institutions which provided 
checks and balances against government expropriation, independent judiciary, and 
established the rule of law, examples being the United States, Canada and Australia.  Their 
two-stage regression estimates show that after instrumenting institutions by the mortality 
figures, institutions account for up to three quarters of the variation in output per worker 
across colonized countries. Their work has subsequently been revised and followed up by 
other authors, including Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2004), Rodrik et al 
(2004), and Fernandes and Kraay (2005), who all confirm that there is a significant 
relationship between institutions and growth thus arguing for the substantial role colonial 
origins play on development levels today. 
In their subsequent paper, AJR (2002) argue that regions with higher population density in 
1500s have some of the worst institutions today, as they were more likely to be subject to 
forced labour and slavery, and were ruled under extractive institutions. After instrumenting 
current institutions (which they measure by urbanization) with population densities, they find 
that a 10% increase in population density in 1500s resulted in 4% lower income per capita in 
1995. Interestingly, they find that when examining countries that were never colonized by the 
Europeans, the relationship between population density and income per capita is positive, 
suggesting the relevance of population density as an instrument for institutions. 
Other papers in the growth literature argue that geography matters as much as colonial origins, 
specifically institutions, in long-run economic development. Amongst the more notable 
studies in this field, include Sachs (2001, 2003) and Diamond (1997) who argue that climatic 
conditions have a direct effect on growth through various factors such as disease ecology, 
climate zone, and distance from the coast. While most of the studies indicate that geography 
becomes insignificant after controlling for institutions, Sachs (2003) reports that malaria 
transmission, which is strongly affected by malaria ecology, still has a direct effect on 
economic growth even after controlling for institutional quality. They find that after 
instrumenting malaria risk with malaria ecology and the share of country‘s population who 
live in temperate ecozones, they find that both institutions and geography are significant at 
the 5% level in explaining the variation in income levels, implying that geography also 
matters.  
The most prominent criticisms against the colonial origin argument of AJR specifically 
institutions come from Albouy (2004, 2006) who claims that the settler mortality rates used 
by AJR suffer from measurement error. Albouy criticizes the data due to the fact that only 28 
of the 64 countries in their original sample have actual data; whereas the other 36 countries 
are assigned rates based on conjectures made by the authors on the similarity of health 
conditions such as the disease environment. Therefore, Albouy drops these observations and 
finds that the effect of settler mortality on expropriation risk (proxy for institutions) is much 
smaller, making it a weak instrument to study the causal effect of institutions on growth. In 
reply, AJR (2005, 2006, 2012) claim that their estimates of the data are supported by 
historical records and are therefore reliable, whereas Albouy‘s data suffer from selection 
biases based on irrational conjectures. Furthermore, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that 
instrumenting institutions by European settler mortality violates the exogeneity assumption 
on the basis that the colonizers brought with them skills and human capital that persisted over 
time. They claim that it is the persistence of these skills that is causing the variation in output 
per worker today, and not the institutions. Moreover, they argue that the measure of 
institutions used by Acemoglu et al. (2005) are a measure of policy outcomes, and not the 
measure of ―constraints‖ on government officials, as defined by North (1981).  They run a 
simple OLS regression of GDP per capita on executive constraints, as well as controlling for 
additional variables, to show that human capital has been the main determinant of growth 
since the colonial period, and not institutions.  
Moving on, Easterly and Levine (2015) create two new datasets, the main one of which is 
Euro Share. This is a dataset that captures the percentage of the total population that were 
Europeans during the colonial time. In line with the findings of AJR, they find that colonial 
origin is the prime determinant of income differences across states. There finding is a further 
argument in favour of the reversal of fortunes claim made by AJR. Additionally, they find 
that it is not only institutions that determine different income levels but also human capital 
and technology, so the effect of colonial origin is more significant than just through the 
channel of institutions. This dataset effectively merges Glaeser et al. (2004) finding with that 
of AJR and shows that regardless of the channel, colonial origins play arguably the most 
important role in GDP per capita differences today.  
THEORY 
Hervé Boulhol highlights
2
 the importance of institutions to realize economic growth. He 
argues in his paper that technology in the economy is a strong component to attain 
productivity, which is primal to our analysis of growth and development. Boulhol‘s study 
mainly focusses on the three major effects of institutions on economic growth: efficiency in 
the use of technology, technology diffusion and eventual long-term TFP growth. His study 
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 Boulhol H, Technology differences, institutions and economic growth: a conditional conditional convergence, 
CEPII 
wanders around the interactions between institutions and technology differences to explain 
cross-country growth pattern
3. The basis of the argument presented is how Boulhol‘s take on 
technology and its approximation as a form of constructive institution impacts the cross-
country growth pattern, and is extended to deduce how it helps in the economic growth of a 
nation. The quality of institution matters profoundly, as the degree of constructiveness 
decides how well the economies grow. Boulhol comments on institutions being a linear 
influence on growth, as well as conditional convergence being conditional on the similarity of 
institutions in terms of quality and efficiency of the nations concerned. AJR argue that they 
are consequential social decisions
4
.  
AJR argue that there is an intertwined relationship between the political and the economic 
institutions because the presence of one affects the other, which in turn influences the 
behaviour of the country
5
. Settlements affected early institutions; and early institutions 
persisted and formed the basis of current institutions. Settler mortality is emphasized owing 
to its ability to determine the types of institution (which affects growth – the hypothesis here) 
in the long term. To make matters simple, Boulhol talks about convergence in the long run, 
which corroborates with Acemoglu‘s arguments on long run stability in the economy being 
the prime outcome of deterministic institutions. An instrument for AJR to judge the 
foundation of the type of institution (extractive or inclusive) is settler mortality rate. The type 
of institution not only decides on the growth level, but also the quality of economic growth 
realised in the country concerned. With the help of the analogous model of Boulhol and the 
technological (hence, institutional) influences on his analysis, an explanation on how the 
quality and the type of institution matter for the country can be made. 
The ideas are juxtaposed to explain how political institutions and the distribution of resources 
in turn determine the distribution of politico-economic power in society. Noted economists in 
the past have propounded what AJR argue is a rather elaborate extension of few of the more 
impactful ideas on growth. Noted theorists like Harrod-Domar, Lewis and more recently 
                                                             
3 In the paper authored by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, it is argued that the differences in the economic 
institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. They theoretically debate on 
the concept, as well as empirically demonstrate how economic institutions determine the incentives of and the 
constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. 
4 Because different groups and individuals from varied contexts typically benefit from different economic 
institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices having manifold effects, ultimately resolved 
in favour of groups with greater political power - AJR 
5
 . Not only limiting the scope of the paper to technological and social institutions, AJR feature in the 
socioeconomic and political institutions that are at play by taking instances of two "quasi-natural experiments" 
in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of 
much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. 
Solow, have argued that without the presence of institutions and technology economies 
would not have been able to grow at all. Economic institutions not only determine the 
aggregate economic growth potential of the economy, but also influence an array of 
economic outcomes, including the distribution of resources in the future (i.e., the distribution 
of wealth, of physical capital or human capital). The colonial past of a country and its setting 
determined the type of colonial presence and therefore the type of institutions the setting 
helped establish.  
 
Boulhol‘s argument6 
Technological diffusion is the process by which innovations (new products, processes or 
management methods) spread within and across economies. According to Boulhol, 
technological progress is not independent from other explanatory variables, and that it 
directly plays a role in determining the shape of the country‘s future. He states that changes 
in output per capita isn‘t just explained by differences of capital per unit of labour. Boulhol 
sets up his argument computing the per capita variables for a Cobb-Douglas equation. This 
helps him identify the contribution of not only capital in the income levels, but also mark the 
role of exogenous variable used for (institutionalised) technology. He recognizes the 
productivity differences, and that both the initial productivity level and the initial output per 
capita are closely linked. It can be safely assumed that the initial level referred to here is the 
initial point for which AJR consider the settler mortality rate. This rate will go on to 
determine which kind of institutions crop up and how they are developed over the years. The 
parameter ‗A‘ is often indistinctly designated as either the productivity or the technology 
level in mainstream growth models. In this analysis, Boulhol attempts to explain the 
technology parameter by breaking it into two explanatory parts, and calls the complement of 
technology in productivity ―efficiency‖7. 
                                                             
6
 Appendix (Theory) for exposition and mathematics 
7
 According to the argument setup, a pure technology level and the degree of efficiency in using this 
technology can explain technology, which in itself is a manifestation of institutions. 
Boulhol makes no remarks about whether the institution is extractive or inclusive (depending 
on the instrument used by AJR– settler mortality rate). His approach is relative: he considers 
a benchmark country purporting to be affluent and economically developed, which serves as 
a comparison variable against which other countries in question are weighed.  The 
proportions of the two components are what Boulhol believes would hint at the type of 
institutions for the setup in the country in question, and would give him the ideal influence of 
the institutions on economic growth. Boulhol considers institutional quality as an influence 
on the technological efficiency and possibly the technology diffusion. Here institutions can 
enter into growth equations through different channels like the level as well as the progress of 
technological efficiency, and possibly the speed of technology diffusion. Boulhol performs 
majority of the calculations in the proportion mode, as this form of the equation explains how 
exactly the institution factor figures out in the model. Taking similar origin points, the 
institutions (manifested in such formats) are the deterministic variables when countries 
decide to choose their path to economic growth. 
Institutions here have an impact through technological efficiency at the inception (origin), 
through the long run TFP-growth deficit to the benchmark, and potentially through the long 
run convergence rate of technologies to the frontier which Boulhol claims to be constant 
across countries or institutionally related. The expression for productivity into Boulhol‘s 
argument, improves it into a growth model. This is quite similar to the macroeconomic 
augmented Solow Model enabled to take into account the heterogeneity of technologies and 
the contribution of institutions. Boulhol introduces in his argument a growth equation which 
is contingent mainly on the population of the economy and the capital depreciation rate. He 
suggests that growth of a country is driven by the conditional convergence rate and the 
contribution of technology diffusion. 
The Boulhol Model has its similarities with that of Solow, where he makes similar 
assumptions on the identicalness of initial total productivity across nations and the absence of 
long run TFP-growth differences
8
. Boulhol considers the similar levels of technology in each 
country because it‘s difficult to scrutinize the differences that are there. The initial level of 
productivity (here, colonial origins) and the speed of convergence (institutionalized growth 
rate) are the factors, which help us, screen out the contribution of institutions in context. 
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 The model processes growth as an aggregation of forces pertaining to the likes of adjusted convergence, 
technological catch-up, non-convergence due to differences in long term investment rates and an additional 
divergence owing to long run TFP-growth disparities 
Boulhol argues that income ratios can be explained by the initial productivity ratios, while the 
capital differences can be justified by the latter‘s complement. Estimates of stocks of physical 
and human capital to infer productivity levels can be made and it can be assessed that 
productivity differences account for half or more of level differences. Since productivity is 
born out of institutions, and enhanced by technology (resources and capital included), it can 
be safely assumed that institutions lead to growth and eventual economic convergence in a 
country
9
.  
Therefore, theory suggests that colonial origins have affected the countries majorly through 
the institutions set up. Political and economic institutions are the backbone determining the 
pathway for countries to grow. The type of growth rate, however, is reliant on the nature of 
institutions that have been positioned. Partially founded on notable work on growth 
economics, Boulhol, Acemoglu et al
10
. paint a similar picture arguing about how colonial 
nations affected the colonies in terms of growth and development. 
DATA 
The dependent variable - To study the effects of colonial origin on development and growth 
across countries we use log of GDP per capita in PPP for the year 2015. The advantages of 
using GDP per capita, as the independent variable is the fact that it has exponential growth 
thus capturing non-linear changes and there is wide availability of this measure for different 
countries.  
The independent variables – For Institutions we use six proxies devised by Kraay and 
Kaufman (2015) which are indicators on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 for the following qualities; rule 
of law, government effectiveness, political stability and nonviolence, control on corruption 
and regulatory quality. We then combine and average these proxies to create the KK-index as 
a proxy for institutions.  
                                                             
9 The extreme simplification in the model runs a risk of misappropriation, and has the merit of highlighting the 
potential correlation between initial productivity and initial output per worker, as well as the comparison of 
how efficient an institution might be and its reflection on the corresponding level of economic growth pattern, 
shows how the institutions impact long term behaviour of the economy. (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997)) 
10
 AJR have empirically proved how the nature of institutions has been dependent on the instruments that 
they’ve considered for regression analysis. Taking settler mortality rate as an indicator, Acemoglu et al. debate 
that extractive institutions were considered for countries with higher numbers and inclusive for the countries 
with lower. 
Rule of law - is a compilation of many measures that determine rule of law some of which are 
property rights and their safety from expropriation, policing quality, the quality and 
efficiency of the judicial courts and contract enforcement, etc. (Kraay et al, 2010) 
Government effectiveness – is a measure of the qualities of the government and its 
effectiveness on policy implementation such as government‘s commitments, measure of the 
extent of political pressure, the speed with which policies are implemented and so on. (Kraay 
et al, 2010) 
Political Stability and nonviolence – is a measure of the lack of politically spurred instability 
and violence in each state which is an amalgamation of measures such as the frequency of 
terrorist activities in each state, ethnic tensions that inspire and result in violence, the rate 
with which governments change; be it coalition break ups or military coups and so on.   
(Kraay et al, 2010) 
Control on corruption – is an indicator of the control on the misuse of state authority by the 
people in power for personal gain, control and extend of bribery in each state, control and 
extend of nepotism, etc.  
Regulatory quality - is an indicator that captures the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies. Some variables used to create this indicator are as follows: 
unfair competitive practices, price controls, discriminatory tariffs, burden of government 
regulations, investment freedom, ease of starting a business, etc.  
Additionally, from Polity IV indicators we use executive constraint as a proxy for institutions.  
This is an indicator, scaled from 1 to 7 with 7 being maximum constraint, of the expropriation 
control put on the government branch of the state, a cap on their ability to abuse power.  We 
take an average from 2006 to 2016, for a period of 11 years.   
For Geography – we use three different proxies first of which is latitude as is used by the 
majority of the papers in the study of the role of geography on growth differences including 
AJR (2001) and Easterly Levine (2012). This proxy consists of the absolute value of latitude 
of each country divided by 90 to get a scale of 0 to 1. The second proxy we use is Malaria 
Ecology; this is used as a proxy for geography as it entails the disease environment. The last 
proxy used is distance from the coast.  
Moving on, we use additional variables as instruments to respond to the simultaneous 
causality problem. The first instrument that we have at our disposal is the settler morality 
devised by Curtin (1998), and improved and used by Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2005)
11
.   
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 AJR use settler mortality as an instrument based on the reasoning that since European colonialists set up 
extractive institutions in places with lower mortality rates, and inclusive institutions in places with low rates of 
mortality, it could be used a valid instrument to be used, if it only creates variation in income through the 
proxies of institutions or human capital.   More on this will be discussed in the second section of our results. 
Another instrument we use is the of the local population density in the 1500s. This is used by 
the same intuition as above. European colonialists set up extractive institutions in areas where 
there were more of the locals by condemning them into slavery stealing their precious metals 
and so on.  The validity of this instrument also depends on the intuition that since population 
density in the 1500s cannot be affected by income today, if used as an instrument for 
institutions, it could solve the simultaneous causality problem; this is subject to it only 
affecting income through the proxies for institutions or human capital.  
Additionally, as in the Easterly-Levine (2015) paper, in this study we use net gross enrolment 
in high schools by both genders worldwide as a proxy for human capital and label it 
education15.  As EL take an average of the early 2000s for 10 years, we update the data and 
take a 10-year average from 2006 to 2015 that is fit for the time period we study. It should be 
noted that in order to see whether the main papers stand the test of time, in this study we use 
updated data for the period of 2005 to 2015 for our exogenous variables where it permissible 
to do so.  
ECONOMETRIC METHODS AND ISSUES 
To find the effect colonial origins in the form of institutions (or human capital and 
technological effects) has on incomes today we must use IV in order to deal with the 
problems of simultaneous causality. The problems of endogeneity and reverse causality make 
it difficult to estimate the true causal relationship between colonial origins in the form of 
institutions and growth.  While there has been enough empirical evidence to suggest that 
causality here runs from institutions to growth (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Rodrik et al, 2002), it 
is still difficult to prove that improvements in institutional quality do not simply occur 
because wealthier countries are simply able to afford it. Thus, running a simple OLS 
regression that estimates the effects of institutions and geography on economic growth will 
give unreliable coefficients, as our estimates will be biased both in upward and downward 
directions. 
The best way to overcome this reverse causality issue is to conduct a randomized controlled 
experiment whereby exogenous variations in institutions and growth can be generated. 
However, in the absence of such experiments, one must employ instrumental variables 
regressions, whereby the instrumental variable has a significant first-stage effect in 
explaining the variation of the endogenous variable (relevance condition) and should also be 
uncorrelated with the error term (validity condition). As mentioned previously, the 
instrumental variable by Acemoglu et al (2001) use the log of European settler mortality and 
local population density in 1500 that satisfy both the above criteria.  
However, the instruments might not be completely exogenous if settler mortality is correlated 
with present day variables that are affecting incomes such as the current disease environment. 
If the instruments are in fact correlated with unobservable factors that are affecting output per 
worker, then the coefficient estimates may be assigning the effect of diseases on income to 
institutions. According to AJR (2001), this is very unlikely to be the case as the vast majority 
of European deaths in the colonies were due to malaria and yellow fever. However, these 
diseases had very limited effect on the indigenous population who already developed the 
immunities to withstand these diseases. Their argument is supported by the mortality rates 
developed by Curtin (1968), who reports that among the local troops serving the British army 
in Bengal and Madras, only 11 to 13 out of 1000 died from local diseases, whereas the annual 
mortality rate of British troops was between 70 and 170 in 1000 in these regions. Therefore, 
according to AJR (2001), these diseases are unlikely to have contributed to the vast 
differences in income per capita among the colonized countries.   
Similarly, for population density in 1500s (write paragraph) 
Econometric Specifications 
To see the relationship between institutions and income per capita, both OLS and 2SLS 
regressions are considered as they provide a basis of comparison with other studies. The 
simple OLS expression takes the form: 
log Yi = μi + β1GEOi + β2INSi + ɛi         (1) 
where i represents countries. Yi is the log of income per capita for country i, μi is a constant, 
GEOi is the proxy for geography, INSi is the proxy for institutions, and ɛi is a set of 
unobservable that influence income per capita. Throughout the paper, we are interested in 
estimating β1 and β2, the effects of institutions and geography on income per capita.  
There are a number of reasons for why equation (1) should not be interpreted as causal. 
Firstly, there might be a problem of reverse causality as discussed previously. Perhaps it is 
higher levels of income that bring about better security, political stability and lower violence. 
This would result in an upward bias in our institutions coefficients. Secondly, analysists may 
have had a natural bias in seeing better quality institutions in richer places, which means that 
the data collected for institutions suffer from measurement error that biases the estimates 
towards zero. Finally, there may be many other omitted determinants that affect income 
levels and that are also correlated with our proxies for institutions. All these issue may result 
in violation of the most important Gauss Markov assumption which requires that the 
independent variables are orthogonal to the error term, i.e. E(u|x) = 0 does not hold. 
Thus, in order to identify the exogenous variation in institutions an instrumental variable 
approach must be used. In the first stage, INSi are regressed on all of the exogenous variables: 
INSʼi = α + δ1SMi + δ2GEO12i + ƞi             (2) 
INSʼi = α + δ1PDi + δ2GEOi + ƞi             (2) 
where SMi refers to European settler mortality and GEOi refers to the geography proxy. The 
reason why geography is included in our first-stage regressions is because it is an exogenous 
determinant of income per capita, as it cannot be influenced by income or institutions. The 
predicted values of INS‘i form the first-stage are then used in the second-stage to obtain 
unbiased estimates of geography and institutions on income per capita. The equation for the 
second-stage least squares takes the following form:   
log Yi = ϣi + τ1GEOi + τ2INSʼi + ρi               (3) 
where the variables are defined exactly as before. This model represents the most natural 
framework for estimating the effects of institutions and geography on economic growth.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS: ACEMOGLU VIS-À-VIS: 
SACHS 
Before presenting the benchmark results, it might be useful to look at a simple bivariate 
relationship between income per capita and each of our proxies for institutions. As can be 
seen in figure 1, all of the eight scatterplots show a clear positive relationship between 
institutions and income per capita. This positive relationship still holds when we include 
latitude as a proxy for geography, as reported in Table 2.  As expected, the coefficients on 
institutions are positive and statistically significant, which means that countries with better 
institutions enjoy higher levels of output. Similarly, the coefficient on latitude states that 
countries further from the equator are more successful in terms of GDP per capita than 
                                                             
12 GEO can also be used for a matrix of other instruments X, the common intuition applies 
countries close to the equator. The high R2 in all of our columns indicates that most of the 
variation in income levels can be explain by our independent variables.  
Figure 1 
Given the positive and significant coefficients on all of the independent variables, it is clear 
that both institutions and geography have the potential to explain the cross-country variations 
in income per capita. However, the coefficients on institutions and geography cannot be 
interpreted as causal as discussed previously. Thus, we employ a two-stage-least-squares 
estimation procedure in Tables 3 and 4, with table 2 reporting the first-stage regressions 
where we instrument institutions with log of European settler mortality and log population 
density in 1500; and table 4 reports the second-stage regressions.  
It can be seen from the first-stage regressions that there is a strong first-stage relationship 
between current institutions and European settler mortality rates, given the very high t-
statistics in all of our settler mortality coefficients. This is consistent with the findings of 
Acemoglu et al (2001) that settler mortality had an important causal effect on early 
institutions that continued to persist to this date. Similarly, our results are consistent with AJR 
(2002) that population density in 1500s are negatively correlated with institutions today. The 
F-statistic test of being equal or greater than 10 confirms that the majority of the proxies used 
for institutions pass the relevance condition, and thus are valid instruments for institutions. 
The R2 in the majority of 
the columns also show that a large variation in institutions can be explained by settler 
mortality and population density during colonization.  
Consistent with the findings of Glaeser et al (2004), settler mortality poorly correlates with 
constitutional measures of checks and balances – as measured by executive constraints taken 
from Polity IV data. We believe that there are both conceptual and methodologic problems 
with this data. First, the executive constraint scores in Polity IV is taking the 
multidimensional concept of institutions and reducing it to a unidimensional scale, which 
means that there is some serious loss of information. The Kaufman and Kraay proxies, 
however, reflect the views on governance of survey respondents and sector exports 
worldwide, and takes a continuous measure, which means there is less room for error.  
Second, institutions is not just about the degree of constraint the executive faces, but rather it 
is a broad measure of things, such as individual rights and personal freedoms. Therefore, we 
do not believe that this measure is an accurate representative of institutional quality, but still 
include it to capture just one more characteristic of institutions 
Table 4 reports the second-stage least squares estimates of regressing the log of GDP per 
capita on institutions and geography. It can be seen that once institutions are instrumented, 
the coefficient on geography goes from being significant as shown in Table 2, to becoming 
insignificant. There are still some significant results in some columns when we instrument 
institutions with log of population density in 1500. One possible explanation by AJR (2002) 
is that the data for population density in 1500 may suffer from serious measurement error 
issues because the event occurred 500 years ago. However, the insignificance of the 
coefficients on geography in Table 4 does not mean that geography has no influence on 
current incomes. Rather, it indirectly influences income per capita through the channel of 
institutions, as can be seen in Table 3 where the geography coefficients are highly significant. 
The results in Table 4 are in line with those of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and is against the 
papers by Sachs (2001; 2003) and McArthur and Sachs (2001) who argue that geography 
plays a large role in determining growth along with institutions. Table 5 reports the first-stage 
and second-stage results where we show that our estimation remains robust to the inclusion of 
two 
additional proxies for geography, malaria ecology and distance from the coast. Malaria 
ecology measures the extent to which mosquito abundance, duration of the transmission 
season and survival rates of mosquitos affect the stability of malaria transmission in a region, 
where higher value indicates that there is a greater chance for malaria transmission. As can be 
seen from Table 5, the coefficient on malaria ecology is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, meaning that countries with higher malaria ecology have lower income per 
capita levels. The coefficient on malaria ecology, however, is very small compared to the kk 
index or rule of law, indicating that although malaria ecology does play a statistically 
significant role, it does not play a major role in explaining economic performance.      
Furthermore, Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (2000) point out those coastal regions enjoy higher 
incomes per capita than countries with landlocked populations. They argue that this is 
because coastal regions have access to a wider scope of the market than interior regions 
because of their ability to engage in sea-based trade, and because they enjoy much lower 
transport costs. Therefore, we use distance from the coast as our second measure to see 
whether countries 
closer to the coast have higher levels of GDP per worker. As can be seen in columns (3)-(4) 
and (7)-(8), distance from the coast is insignificant in determining growth after institutions 
are instrumented.  
The reason why we only include the kk index and rule of law in Table 5 is that Sachs (2003) 
uses these two proxies, along with expropriation risk measure to show that geography matters. 
However, data on expropriation risk is no longer available but is still captured in our measure 
of control of corruption, thus we un-cluster the kk index in the appendix section and show 
that the results for geography still holds for individual proxies for institutions.   
It is important to note that the R-squared in the second-stage least squares is no longer 
interpretable as the sum of squared residuals can exceed the total sum of squares, which 
would result in negative R-squares
13
.  
 
                                                             
13 (R2 = 1 – SSR/TTS). 
ALBOUY 
Albouy opposes AJR primarily on three grounds: Weak instruments, outliers in specific 
regions, and lack of ―campaign‖ dummies. Albouy claims that AJR‘s attempt to show the 
impacts of property rights on economic performance isn‘t efficient as there is a positive 
correlation between the economic measures and the institutional proxies. These correlations 
run a risk of displaying reverse causalities of the economy on institutional development. 
AJR‘s usage of the IV is what Albouy criticizes (Albouy, 2004 a, b). Albouy takes certain 
specifications that have similar effects to the model
14
. Settler mortality tends to lose 
significance in the first stage equation determining expropriation risk
15
. On robustness checks 
and dropping the 36 conjectured data (that mask the collinearity between the controls and the 
more accurately  
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 Controls for continents, climate, geography – latitude and neo-European (control) rates, colonial nationality, 
and population of European origin, percentage of the population living where malaria is endemic in 1994 (used 
in AJR) and a combination control of Continent Indicators and Latitude 
15
 To find that point estimate of the effect expropriation risk on GDP, tends to be as large as or larger than in 
AJR’s. Albouy presents the first-stage estimates of β obtained when one applies the checks using these 
controls – where his mortality rates show significance in prediction of expropriation risk. 
Table 6: Instrumental variables estimates with Albouy’s settler mortality data 
  
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2015 (current PPP) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Panel A. Second-stage: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita 
 
Rule of law 
1.394***   
(0.298) 
      
Executive constraint  2.627   
(2.736) 
     
Political stability and 
non-violence 
  2.088** 
(0.828) 
    
Voice and 
Accountability 
   2.523**  
(1.152) 
   
Government 
effectiveness 
    1.109***  
(0.169) 
  
Regulatory Quality      1.425***  
(0.290) 
 
Control of Corruption       1.389*** 
(0.327) 
Geography (Latitude) -0.878   
(1.194) 
0.399   
(5.086) 
0.258 
(1.954) 
-1.863 
(2.856) 
0.422   
(0.741) 
0.094     
(1.019) 
 
-0.974 
(1.328) 
Constant 9.384***   
(0.312) 
 
-5.198   
(14.337) 
9.73*** 
(0.669) 
9.75*** 
(0.776) 
8.966***  
(0.191) 
9.057***   
(0.262) 
9.438***  
(0.351) 
Observations 
 
33 31 33 33 33 33 33 
 
 
Panel B: First-Stage for Endogenous Variables (Institutions) 
 RL EC PSNV V & A GE RQ CC 
Latitude 
 
0.891   
(0.954) 
-0.113   
(2.182) 
0.051   
(1.124) 
0.883    
(1.041) 
-0.052   
(0.921) 
0.189 
(0.979) 
0.963 
(1.080) 
 
Log European settler 
mortality (logmal) 
 
-0.37*** 
(0.101) 
 
 
-0.203   
(0.232) 
 
-0.25**  
(0.119) 
 
-0.205*  
(0.110) 
 
-0.47***  
(0.098) 
 
-0.363 
*** 
(0.104) 
 
-0.37***  
(0.115) 
Constant 
 
1.43**  
(0.61) 
 
6.34***  
(1.381) 
0.792   
(0.714) 
0.647  
(0.661) 
2.175***   
(0.585) 
1.63*** 
(0.622) 
1.396**    
(0.686) 
R-square 
 
0.432 0.032 0.160 0.196 0.493 0.357 0.378 
F-statistic 11.39 0.46 2.86 3.67 14.58 8.34 9.13 
Notes: Standard Errors are in the parentheses. All regressions are cross-sectional OLS with one observation 
per country. Executive constraint is on a scale of 1-7 with 7 being more control. The other proxies for 
institutions are on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 where 2.5 is more control and better institutions. *Significant at 10 
percent; **Significant at 5 percent ***Significant at 1 percent. 
 
measured rates), Albouy notices widening standard errors and gradual increase of 
significance in controls with the (original) given small sample size
16
.  
Albouy claims that there is a weak instrument problem (aggravating on application of 
robustness checks), as β is not significantly different from zero17. AJR prove their point first 
focussing on the significant stage 1 relationship, and then turn to the second-stage estimates. 
AJR‘s confidence intervals (by AR) are robust in the presence of weak instruments only to 
conclude there is no presence of a weak instrument problem in the data series+ (Chernozukov 
and Hansen, 2005). 
+ We have carried out the weak instrument test (see Appendix (Weak Instrument Test)) only 
to find a similar result to AJR, despite having the knowledge that the AJR analysis employs 
weak instruments for institutions. This has not, however, affected the significance of any of 
the variables with which we have worked on the paper. 
Albouy argues that 60% of the sample, which are from Latin America and Africa, should be 
dropped as arbitrary
18
 (Albouy, 2012) to which AJR reply with documents substantiating 
information on mortality of Europeans (AJR, 2012; Gutierrez, 1986). Albouy criticizes AJR‘s 
inconsistencies involving both campaigning soldiers and working labourers. He argues that in 
either case, the mortality rates would have been outliers. Therefrom, Albouy points out that 
AJR have unfairly exaggerated the mortality rates in areas with currently bad institutions
19
. 
AJR (2005) show that the results actually get stronger if (missing) data-points are dropped, 
and argue that limiting the effect of outliers has no impact on our substantive results and if 
anything significantly strengthens them, even making them robust
20
. The effect of institutions 
on income per capita is weaker when as covariates the current prevalence of malaria or the 
percent of population that was of European descent in 1975 (as proxies for geography) are 
included. 
                                                             
16 Albouy notes that the campaign and labourer indicators become much more significant once the 
conjectured data are dropped. 
17 . Albouy mentions that AJR’s inference based on the IV estimate using conventional asymptotic confidence 
regions based on the Wald statistic can be grossly incorrect (Dufour 1997) 
18
 Albouy notes that there is a lack of data for 36 observations from the dataset of AJR containing 64 countries 
into account. AJR probably derives the value for these 36 countries from the pattern displayed by the other 
ones, which according to Albouy might not be plausible inferences as it noticeably reduces the significance of 
the results, and the mortality rates not being from actual European settlers. 
19
 Albouy’s paper shows the insignificance of both the first stage (regression of mortality into institutions) and 
the second stage (institutions on per capita income) if the usual AJR assumptions are altered, thus arguing the 
data series they constructed suffers from “inconsistencies, questionable judgements, and errors.” 
20
 AJR (2000, 2001) discussed the issue of high mortality rates at length and used logarithms to reduce the 
impact. 
AJR believe in constructing the series by combining the mortality rates of soldiers (Curtin 
1989, 1998), labourers (Curtin et al. 1995), and bishops (Gutierrez, 1986) from different 
time-periods, mostly prior to the twentieth century. Here, AJR first attack the two variables 
taken by Albouy for his argument and note issues with the same (AJR, 2005, 2012). The new 
series with barracks and campaign finds itself with problems including (but not restricted to) 
selective assignments of mortality rates (West Africa), contradiction to historical records, 
implausible assumptions on merging of data (Latin America), insistent usage of non-updated 
data after a significant political and economic overhaul, ignoring self-introduced data (Cohen, 
1983) and mixing of weighted and unweighted averages in the construction of the temporal 
morality rates.  
AJR argue that Albouy's treatment (preferred sample) on grounds of dubious decision-
making
21
. Albouy is claimed to have put in values, which, if slightly altered, would yield 
results similar to AJR‘s (AJR 2005, 2012).  Without offering a structured justification, 
Albouy‘s treatment selectively assigns of a few countries (Senegal, Ghana) to other countries 
of similar sorts (Gambia, Cote d‘Ivoire)+. AJR notes this supposedly unfounded practice to be 
prevalent while the assignment of mortality rates in more than one county is concerned – 
wherein Albouy assigns the same rate to all the neighbours of one particular country which 
displays the mortality rate in question. AJR also calls out on Albouy on inconsistency of data 
and lack of robustness when regressions are run without the significant country (West Africa, 
in this case). 
+
 While the logic behind Albouy‘s treatment can be argued to be coherence and overt 
similarities between countries, no proper structure is available in any of his papers (Albouy, 
2004b, 2006).  
AJR and build a case against Albouy‘s criticisms by showing that the only reason that either 
of Albouy‘s series give significantly different results from theirs is because of a sequence of 
odd and indefensible coding decisions. 
AJR establish that after a few tiny modulations in the data Albouy‘s results resemble their 
own, and point out that Albouy selective data reporting (and misquotations and 
misrepresentations) as well as ignored data on regions (Austin, Feinberg, Graham et al)
22
. 
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 AJR argue that Albouy’s results are significantly different from theirs owing to some of the assumptions. 
22
 To strengthen the case, AJR organize and discuss in detail Albouy’s suggested revisions on Africa, the 
Americas and Asia (morality rates and data-points for consideration) by region, taking the latter’s barrack and 
campaign series along with their original one. 
They denounce the barrack and the campaign series on ground of inconsistency and not 
having a fixed motive or rationale for being used
23. Albouy‘s accusations about the small 
sample size of the dataset
+
 and its subsequent misinterpretations by the authors are put to rest 
by AJR when they deal with the established sources in reply to Albouy‘s country set24. AJR 
argue that Albouy‘s dataset lowered mortality rates making the estimates less reliable as 
proxies for European Settler Mortality Rate (Curtin, Tulloch).  
AJR claim to extend the description of the data (64 to 84 countries)
+
 such that it is more 
representative and robust with additional data collected. Most notably, Albouy manages to 
make it clear the need to state more explicitly the selection procedure and the idea behind it 
in the 2001 paper of AJR.
25
  
+
The issue with the AJR-Albouy debate skews heavily toward Albouy‘s side as he fails to 
come up with newer points of rebuttal after AJR modifies their argument with solid backing.  
AJR show how for each segment of time (war, peace, etc.), they have considered the earliest 
peacetime number available, and on the non-availability of the information, the earliest 
mortality estimate from an ―expedition‖ — small samples of campaigns as an alternative for 
data gathering purposes
+
.  
+
In our paper, the logic which we have used (with arguments) for rank-based proxies for 
institutions when we could not avail data is similar to that of AJR. The reasons why data 
could not be found is standard and given, and we have pinned down the least number that was 
available in the rank scale. The smallest number and the largest number in the scale represent 
the minimum and the maximum intensities of the case at hand, respectively.  
AJR uses rates campaigns more frequently in countries with greater expropriation risk and 
lower GDP, artificially preferring to maintain colonial origins impact countries through 
institutions instrumented by settler mortality rate. But Albouy claims this to be problematic 
for AJR
26
 as it is well known that soldiers on campaign typically have higher mortality from 
                                                             
23 Albouy operates with two variables for settler mortality - barracks and campaigns. He thus sets up his 
argument with these variables, establishing that the impact institutions supposedly have over cross-country 
growth pattern (Stage 2) in general are weakened or eliminated by showing the weak impact of settler 
mortality on institutions (Stage 1). 
24
 Albouy’s disregard for important information on overhauls and transient procedures skewed the data 
considerably, much to the dismay of AJR, who claim to have followed procedure and referenced facts to 
denote ranks and numbers to the appropriate cases. 
25
 Albouy’s success is that it has managed to address the lack of details in data construction for AJR. 
26
 According to Albouy, controlling for the source of the mortality rates weakens the empirical relationship 
between expropriation risk and mortality rates substantially. 
disease. He names AJR‘s result as an artefact of the data‘s construction (no homogenous 
pattern of values and data-points), because if these controls are added and the conjectured 
data are removed, the relationship virtually disappears. Sans environment, much of the 
variation assigned would have to be measurement aberrations, which, Albouy notes, is 
disturbing. 
+
 AJR only consistently use latitude as a control variable. In our paper, we use latitude as a 
proxy for geography, along with malaria ecology and distance from ice-free coast. 
AJR points out the specification in which the second stage estimates are sometimes 
insignificant is the one that includes current prevalence of malaria
+
, which is a specification 
that biases result against finding significant effects (endogeneity problem). But even after 
accounting for malaria, continent dummies (as per Albouy‘s argument) and latitude, AJR are 
allowed to statistically reject the hypothesis that institutions have no effect on GDP per capita 
since the second stage coefficient isn‘t zero. They capped mortality rates in 250 (per 1000 
p.a.) which typically strengthened the results (AJR 2005), so much so that it makes AJR‘s 
approach impervious to Albouy‘s other critiques. 
+
We have also shown the insignificance of malaria (as a proxy for geography) against 
institutions.  
From Table 3, it‘s evident that almost every instrument except executive constraint is 
significant at the 1% level when IV regressed with log of GDP. We have controlled for 
geography proxied by latitude, where we see negative coefficients for three variables. We 
take Albouy‘s data of log of settler mortality rates to run regressions and add our proxies for 
institutions. For constructing the dataset, we take updated data and extend our analysis to 
show that the results hold significance till date. We see that our results are significant, where 
geography isn‘t. Given our instrument of settler mortality, the finding confirms the findings 
of Acemoglu et al. that colonial origins did indeed have institutions as its most profound 
reason for income differences across countries. In our IV regression, for example, a country 
with 0.1 unit more rule of law tends to have a per capita income at PPP that is higher by 
1.394 log points. That is quite a significant improvement in the economic performance of a 
country given that the mean of GDP per capita for our sample is 9.252. The first stage shows 
the regressions between the settler mortality rates taken from Albouy as the instrument. 
Albouy‘s dropping the data is which is why we are also working here with 33 observations.  
EASTERLY-LEVINE 
In the third section of the results, we look closely at Easterly and Levine‘s focus of colonial 
European share of the population. This focus builds on AJR‘s focus on the role of colonial 
origin on development. Whereas AJR focus on the role of institutions, EL create a new 
dataset on the share of Europeans in the colonies. They find significant results between 
income today and colonial origin, proxied by colonial European share of the population. They 
add further controls to see whether the effect of colonial European share of the population 
remains significant in determining development level differences across states and concur 
that they do. It must be noted that the use of institutions and settler mortality by AJR only 
focused on the type of institutions the colonialists set up. EL‘s use of euro share encompasses 
institutions as well as human capital and technological effects European colonization have 
had on the colonies and thus on the different levels of incomes today.  
We follow the EL paper and run our own regressions on the role of euro share on income by 
using updated data on income levels for 2015, institution proxied by the KK index that we 
devised and executive constraint, both average of the period of 2005-2015, and human capital 
proxied by the education variable that is an average of the period 2006-2015. This is to see 
whether EL‘s finding stand the test of time. In addition, we use the three proxies for 
geography as used in the first section of the results to analyse Sachs‘ critique.  
In table 7, we test the relationship between many independent variables and euro share, this 
is done to see where the colonialists settled. To do so, population density in the 1500s, 
geography proxied by latitude, malaria ecology, biogeography, distance from London and 
distance from the coast as well as settler mortality of the European colonialists and the settler 
mortality of the local population due to European imported diseases is regressed on euro 
share. In line with the findings of EL we find that Europeans settled in areas where the local 
population density was higher, geography played a role on where they settled, however what 
we find contrasting to the finding of EL is that once we account for the European settler 
mortality as shown in specification (7), indigenous mortality becomes insignificant. However, 
EL finds indigenous mortality to be insignificant and European settler mortality significant 
once they include all the controls mentioned above. Once we take in all controls, we find the 
same result as indicated in specification (9).  
In order to study the role of colonial origin on development, we run OLS regressions using 
Euro share, British legal origin, Education, Independence
27
, executive constraint, the KK 
index and ethnicity
28
. To study the true effects of European colonisers, just as EL, we take out 
all the European countries. Additionally, we use current percentage of population of 
European descend –current Euro share- as an exogenous variable to control for the effect that 
may have on income levels today and the uncluster that effect from the euro share coefficient. 
From table 8 we find that there is a positive, notable and significant effect on log of GDP per 
                                                             
27
 Independence is the fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent (Easterly and Levine, 
2015).  
28 Ethnicity the measure of each states degree of ethnic diversity devised by Easterly and Levine in 1997.  
capita today by euro share except when we include the KK index (our preferred proxy for 
institutions) and the human capital proxy, education. Euro share becomes insignificant when 
using the latter two regressors, education and KK index, because these two variables account 
for the channels through which Euro share could affect current income. However, it should 
be noted that the effect of these two regressors on GDP are prone to the simultaneous 
causality bias when using basic OLS.  
 
In table 9, we go further and run the same OLS regressions as in table 2 but we only take the 
sample of non-European countries that have had a colonial European population of less than 
12.5%. There are two reasons in doing so, as pointed out by EL. Firstly, the results we get in 
table 8 could be due the case that highly developed ex-colonies today can happen to have a 
Table 9: Log of GDP per capita in 2015 controlling for proportion of population of European descent 
with Euro Share<12.5% 
 Dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 2015 (current PPP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Euro share 6.278** 
(2.419) 
6.813*** 
(2.504) 
3.151 
(2.749) 
9.525*** 
(2.991) 
7.895** 
(2.682) 
2.546 
(2.876) 
7.648*** 
(2.518) 
9.542*** 
(3.022) 
Current Euro 
share 
0.757* 
(0.413) 
1.004** 
(0.484) 
0.147 
(0.351) 
-0.111 
(0.856) 
0.908* 
(0.498) 
0.359 
(0.431) 
0.4005 
(0.439) 
-0.303 
(0.840) 
British legal 
origin 
 0.180 
(0.230) 
     0.158 
(0.228) 
Education   0.015** 
(0.006) 
    
Independenc
e 
   0.792 
(0.528) 
   0.675 
(0.496) 
Executive 
constraint  
    -0.091 
(0.081) 
   
kk index      1.057*** 
(0.125) 
  
Ethnicity       -1.07*** 
(0.317) 
-0.876** 
(0.367) 
         
         
Constant 8.57*** 
(0.149) 
8.412*** 
(0.169) 
7.780**
* 
(0.377) 
8.263*** 
(0.188) 
9.01*** 
(0.422) 
9.093*** 
(0.138) 
8.924*** 
(0.221) 
8.610*** 
(0.303) 
Observations 89 87 89 69 82 89 84 68 
R-square 0.074 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.42 0.25 0.30 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Executive constraint is on a scale of 1-7 with 7 being 
more control. KK index is an average of the six institutional proxies created by Kraay and Kaufman and ranges 
from -2.5 to +2.5 where 2.5 is more control and better institutions. *Significant at 10 percent; **Significant at 5 
percent ***Significant at 1 percent. 
 
large fraction of Europeans in its population. This would bias the study and show significant 
results in favour of Euro share thus colonial origin. Secondly, as argued out in the AJR and 
  
We find that once we decrease the sample to less than 12.5% euro share only, the coefficient 
on euro share increases significantly and is statistically significant except, once again, when 
we use education and the KK index. To sum up table 9, in a sample of countries with less 
than 12.5% colonial European population, the euro share determines income levels 
significantly, 
be it through human capita or/and institutions. Additionally, we find, as do EL, that even 
when we use a small euro share sample, the economic effects of European colonialism are 
positive. EL point out that this is the cause until the euro share drops to 4.7%. This is a strong 
claim on behalf of the colonial origins of income differences across countries.  
To further examine our findings, in table 10A we add a number of control variables to see 
whether the role of Euro share is still as significant. These controls are: indigenous mortality; 
Latitude, malaria ecology and biogeography as a proxy for geography; Precious metals as a 
proxy for the effect and the role of natural resources; London, and Settler Mortality. And in 
table 10B we further use the less than 12.5% euro share sample. We find the same results, as 
in the previous tables that euro share is significant. Except of course, when we include 
human capital or institutions proxies. It must be noted that in our smaller sample of < 12.5% 
euro share even when we include proxies for institutions, the KK index and executive 
constraint, the effect remains significant which shows that there are other direct effects on 
income levels unaccounted for by our human capital and institutions proxies. This could 
include, as is not limited to, technological effects.  
We go a step further and see whether we could use euro share as an instrument on our 
instrument proxies, kk index and executive constraint. From the results mentioned above, we 
found that once education and institutions‘ proxies are accounted for, euro share effect on 
current income per capita becomes insignificant in the full sample of non-European countries. 
To test whether it‘s a valid instrument we run an OLS of education on euro share and current 
euro share as well as with and without geography and human capital proxies; distance from 
the coast and education. We find that colonial euro share is insignificant. Running the same 
regression with executive constraint and then the kk index as the dependent variables, thus 
the first stage of IV regression, we find euro share to be significant in the case of the kk index 
(and not the executive constraint). This regression together with the findings of the OLS 
regressions in the previous tables show that euro share only affects log of GDP per capita 
through the kk index. We then move on and use euro share as an instrument for kk index. The 
second stage IV is tabulated in table 5. We find that with and without the geography and 
human capital proxy, the kk index affects income levels and current share of European 
descendants in the population remains insignificant. However when we use the smaller 
sample of euro share <12.5% this results do not hold. This is because there are other channels 
through which euro share affects income levels making it an invalid instrument. However, 
overall we affirm the findings of AJR ‗the reversal of fortunes‘29 claim and EL‘s finding that 
European colonial origin are the prime determinants of economic differences across countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
29
 . ‘Reversal of fortunes’ in short is rich countries back in history being poorer today as the colonialists set up 
extractive institutions in those areas. 
CONCLUSION 
The paper takes Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson‘s argument that colonial origins have 
influenced the growth pattern across nations mainly through institutions, among other factors. 
Given the presence of endogeneity, we tried to explain why institutions play an important 
role by using IV regressions, addressing three distinctive counterarguments and 
augmentations. We address Albouy‘s claim on settler mortality usage by using his own 
revised settler mortality and found AJR‘s findings stand. Our analysis on Sachs‘ criticism is 
founded by the usage of different proxies to show how Geography, though very important a 
determinant of cross-country growth patterns, is not as impactful as institutions. The paper 
addresses Sachs‘ arguments by taking different proxies for Geography that what he has based 
his arguments on. This not only helps us explore the depth of the argument further, but also 
provides us with an insight as to what other variables may be considered for a Geography 
proxy to better describe its effect. The paper finally addresses the euro share used by Easterly 
and Levine who typically uphold AJR‘s argument as well as adding that human capital and 
technology matters as well. Thus justifying the concentration on colonial Euro Share as it 
encompasses all of the above. EL run OLS regressions, but we have extended their analysis 
to IV regressions and tried to estimate the results. Our paper instruments current institutions 
with variables including, but not limited to, European settler mortality rates and population 
density in 1500s to prove that AJR‘s results categorically hold up to all of Albouy‘s three 
critiques, as well as to Sachs‘ arguments even when we use different proxies, varied 
estimation methods, extended analyses and updated data. The paper focuses on EL‘s analysis 
on European colonial settlements and human capital, and proves that the EL extension and 
use of Euro share is econometrically justified. The figures, taken from a plethora of sources, 
do conform to the dominance of institutions of other factors in influencing growth when 
colonial origins are concerned. 
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APPNEDIX 
 
Table 11: Variable definitions and sources of data 
Variables Sources Description of each variable  
Current Euro 
share 
Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Current European fraction of the total population  
logmal Albouy (2005) Albouy‘s Log of settler mortality  
LGDP The World Bank  Log of GDP per capita in 2015 (in PPP) 
KK index Created by the 
Authors 
Index of the six institution‘s proxies created by 
Kraay and Kaufman averaged out: va, psnv, ge, 
rule, cc, rq over the period of 2006-2016 
(abbreviation details below) 
Euro share Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Fraction of the total population in the colonies 
representing Europeans 
Executive 
Constraint  
Polity IV data  Constraint on the executive averaged for the period 
2006-2015 with a scale of One to Seven 
Voice and 
accountabilit
y 
Kaufman and Kraay 
government 
indicators  
Voice And accountability indicator averaged for the 
period 2006-2015. On a scale of -2.5-2.5 
Political 
stability and 
non-violence 
Kaufman and Kraay 
government 
indicators  
Political Stability and Non-violence indicator 
averaged for the period 2006-2015. On a scale of -
2.5-2.5 
Government 
effectiveness 
Kaufman and Kraay 
government 
indicators  
The effectiveness of government indicator averaged 
for the period 2006-2015. On a scale of -2.5-2.5 
Rule of law - Kaufman and 
Kraay government 
indicators  
Rule of Law indicator averaged for the period 2006-
2015. On a scale of -2.5-2.5 
Control of 
corruption 
Kaufman and Kraay 
government 
indicators  
Control on corruption indicator averaged for the 
period 2006-2015. On a scale of -2.5-2.5 
Regulator 
quality 
Kaufman and Kraay 
government 
indicators  
Regulatory quality indicator averaged for the period 
2006-2015. On a scale of -2.5-2.5 
Settler 
Mortality 
AJR (2005) Logarithm of settler mortality in 83 ex-colonies as 
deaths per year per 1000 people 
Population  
density in 
1500 
AJR (2001, 2005) Log of local population each square km in the 1500s 
Latitude Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Value of Latitude divided by 90 to be used as a 
geography proxy 
  
Malaria 
Ecology 
Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
―An index of the stability of malaria transmission 
based biological characteristics of mosquitos such 
as the proportion of blood meals taken from human 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THEORY (EXPOSITION) 
Hervé Boulhol highlights the importance of institutions to realize economic growth. He 
argues in his paper
30
 that technology in the economy is a strong component to attain 
productivity, which is primal to our analysis of growth and development. Boulhol‘s study 
mainly focusses on the three major effects of institutions on economic growth: efficiency in 
the use of technology, technology diffusion and eventual long-term TFP growth. In order to 
found a rational explanation as to how exactly do institutions form an essential part of the 
growth and development process for the economy, the Boulhol model provides us with an 
exceptional insight. His study wanders around the interactions between institutions and 
technology differences to explain cross-country growth pattern. In the paper
31
 authored by 
                                                             
30
 Boulhol H, Technology differences, institutions and economic growth : a conditional conditional convergence, 
CEPII, 2004 
31 AJR 
hosts, daily survival of the mosquito, and duration 
of the transmission season and of extrinsic 
incubation.‖ (EL, 2015) 
Indigenous 
mortality 
Easterly and Levine 
(2015 
A dummy for the mortality rates of the local 
population as a result of European colonialists‘ 
diseases  
Biogeograph
y 
Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Log of the number of native plants species and of 
native animals species to exhibit domestication. 
Education15 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators  
Secondary school enrollment rate averaged for the 
period between 2005-2015 
Ethnicity   Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Index of ethnic diversity created by Easterly and 
Levine in 1997 
Independenc
e  
Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
A country‘s independent as the fraction of years 
since 1776 
London Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Distance of each state from London 
Ex-colony Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
A Dummy variable for ex-colonies (equaling one) 
created by AJR  
British Legal 
Origin 
(legaluk) 
AJR (2005) A Dummy for countries with British legal origin 
and civil law 
Distance 
from the 
coast  
Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Average distance of a country from the ice free 
coast or sea-navigable river  
Precious 
metals 
(metals) 
Easterly and Levine 
(2015) 
Natural recourses dummy 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, it is argued that the differences in the economic 
institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. They 
theoretically debate on the concept, as well as empirically demonstrate how economic 
institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape 
economic outcomes. In this paper, the basis of the argument presented is how Boulhol‘s take 
on technology and its approximation as a form of constructive institution impacts the cross-
country growth pattern. The analysis is extended to deduce how technology (as a 
representation of institutions) help in the economic growth of a nation. The quality of 
institution matters profoundly, as the degree of constructiveness decides how well the 
economies grow. Boulhol comments on trade being a linear influence on growth, as well as 
conditional convergence being conditional on the similarity of institutions in terms of quality 
and efficiency of the nations concerned. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that they 
are consequential social decisions. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit 
from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, 
ultimately resolved in favour of groups with greater political power.  
Not only limiting the scope of the paper to technological and social institutions, Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson feature in the socioeconomic and political institutions that are at play 
by taking instances of two "quasi-natural experiments" in history, the division of Korea into 
two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world 
by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. Settlements affected early institutions; 
and early institutions persisted and formed the basis of current institutions. Settler mortality is 
emphasized owing to its ability to determine the types of institution (which affects growth – 
the hypothesis here) in the long term. To make matters simple, Boulhol talks about 
convergence in the long run, which corroborates with Acemoglu‘s arguments on long run 
stability in the economy being the prime outcome of deterministic institutions. An instrument 
for Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson to judge the foundation of the type of institution 
(extractive or inclusive) is settler mortality rate. The type of institution not only decides on 
the growth level, but also the quality of economic growth realised in the country concerned. 
With the help of the analogous model of Boulhol and the technological (hence, institutional) 
influences on his analysis, an explanation on how the quality and the type of institution 
matter for the country can be made. 
The arguments of AJR are considered, as their intentions can theoretically ably be explained 
by the three arguments forwarded by Boulhol. The ideas are juxtaposed to form a better-
looking scenario, which can substantiate the claims of how the distribution of politico-
economic power in society is in turn determined, by political institutions and the distribution 
of resources.  
Boulhol’s Model for Technological Diffusion and Institution for Growth 
Technological diffusion is the process by which innovations (new products, processes or 
management methods) spread within and across economies. Boulhol does not assume that 
technological profiles of the countries across the world are on a similar level, or that the 
differences in the level of technology in the countries are treated as residuals. Therefore, 
technological progress are not independent from other explanatory variables, and that it 
directly plays a role in determining the shape of the country‘s future. He states that changes 
in output per capita is not just explained by differences of capital per unit of labour. 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function and with standard notations, 
1. Yi = (AiLi)
 1-a-b
K
a
i
 
Hi
b
 
where Y is output, K and H are stocks of physical and human capital respectively; A is the 
productivity level and L the number of workers. Output per worker yi for the country i is 
therefore given by  
2. yi = Yi/Li = (Ai)
 1-a-b
(Ki/Li)
 a 
(Hi/Li)
b
 
with Z
KH
 = K(H/L)
b/a
 defining a capital aggregate of the physical capital stock and the human 
capital stock per capita. Equation (2) illustrates that initial output per worker is certainly 
linked to initial productivity. 
If it‘s assumed that the productivity level Ai is independent of the country (Ai = A, ∀ i), then 
Boulhol finds through empirics the ratio of output per capita in between two extreme cases 
(countries) translates into a highly unrealistic capital aggregate, Z
KH
, per capita ratio of 
unrealistic proportions using a physical capital share of one-third.  
Moreover, recognising the productivity differences, it is apparent from equation (2), valid at 
each time, that both the initial productivity level and the initial output per capita are closely 
linked, which renders growth equation estimates assuming identical productivity seriously 
biased. For the sake of exposition, it can be safely assumed that the initial level referred to 
here can be taken as the initial point for which Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson consider the 
settler mortality rate. This settler mortality rate will go on in the later periods to determine 
which kind of institutions crop up and how they are developed over the years. The parameter 
A is often indistinctly designated as either the productivity or the technology level. In this 
analysis, the parameter is broken into two parts. The distinction is made between the two 
notions, and the complement of technology in productivity is called ―efficiency‖.  
Ai is broken into two components: a pure technology level Bi and the degree of efficiency in 
using this technology Xi such that Ai equals BiXi. A country which is affluent and 
economically developed is chosen as the benchmark country, with which the comparisons of 
the other countries can be made (a proportion can be calculated). (Bassanini and Scarpetta 
(2001)) 
bi = Bi/Bben is denoted, which is an inverse indicator of the distance to the frontier, xi = 
Xi/Xben, is the ratio of the relative efficiency to the benchmark, and ai = Ai / Aben = bi.xi, the 
relative productivity level. Boulhol as an influence on the technological efficiency Xi and 
possibly the technology diffusion that is most simply governed by considers institutional 
quality: 
3. ḃi(t) = vi.(1 – bi(t))  
where t stands for time: in the long run technologies converge to the frontier at a pace 
represented by vi, which Boulhol claims to be constant across countries or institutionally 
related.  
The pure technology component is assumed to converge (or diverge if vi is negative), and 
total productivity discrepancies may persist as a result of differences in institutionally-related 
efficiency Xi. Here institutions enter into growth equations through three different channels: 
the level of technological efficiency, the progress of technological efficiency and possibly the 
speed of technology diffusion. Noticing that the productivity level Ai can be written as 
Aben.bi.xi, TFP-growth can be divided into three components: 
4. 
Ȧ𝒊
𝑨𝒊
=  
Ȧ𝒃𝒆𝒏
𝑨𝒃𝒆𝒏
+
 ẋ𝒊
𝒙𝒊
+
 ḃ𝒊
𝒃𝒊
 
The first term on the right is simply the benchmark TFP-growth, denoted by g, the second, 
denoted –ci  , is the long run TFP-growth deficit to the benchmark and the third is the 
technological catch-up component derived from resolving the differential equation (3). The 
proportion mode of the equation explains how exactly the institution factor figures out in the 
model. Taking similar origin points, the institutions (manifested in such formats) are the 
deterministic variables when countries decide to choose their path to economic growth. 
5. 
Ȧ𝒊
𝑨𝒊
= 𝒈 − 𝒄𝒊 +  
𝒗𝒊(𝟏 − 𝒃𝒊 𝟎 )
𝒆𝒗𝒊.𝒕 –  (𝟏 –  𝒃𝒊(𝟎))
 
Institutions here have an impact through Xi(0), through ci, and potentially through vi. 
Integrating equation (5) into the growth equation, the model that is developed is a growth 
model. This is quite similar to the macroeconomic augmented Solow Model enabled to take 
into account the heterogeneity of technologies and the contribution of institutions. With ni 
denoting the population growth, d the physical and human capital depreciation rate, si
K 
and 
si
H
 the fraction of total income invested in physical and human capital respectively, Boulhol 
has derives extensively (the growth model derivations) and establishes the following growth 
equation: 
6. 
𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝒚𝒊 𝒕 − 𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝒚𝒊(𝟎)
𝒕
=  −
𝟏 −  𝒆−𝜷𝒊.𝒕
𝒕
. 𝑳𝒐𝒈 
𝒚𝒊 𝟎 
𝒂𝒊 𝟎 .𝑨𝒃𝒆𝒏 𝟎 
+  
𝟏 −  𝒆−𝜷𝒊.𝒕
𝒕
𝑳𝒐𝒈  
(𝒔𝒊
𝑲)𝒂. (𝒔𝒊
𝑯)𝒃
𝒏𝒊 + 𝒅 + 𝒈 − 𝒄𝒊
 
𝟏
𝟏−𝒂−𝒃
+  𝒈 − 𝒄𝒊 + 𝒇𝒗,𝒕(𝒃𝒊 𝟎 ) 
 
where βi = (1 – a – b).(ni + d + g -ci) is the usual speed of conditional convergence and the 
last term  
7. 𝒇𝒗,𝒕 𝒃𝒊 𝟎  =  
𝟏
𝒕 
𝑳𝒐𝒈
𝟏− 𝟏−𝒃𝒊 𝟎  𝒆−𝒗𝒊.𝒕
𝒃𝒊(𝟎) 
  ≈  
𝟏
𝒃𝒊 𝟎 
− 𝟏 𝒗𝒊   
is the contribution of technology diffusion to growth: it is positively related to the speed vi 
and to the distance to the technological frontier. Equation (6) is to be compared to the 
augmented-Solow growth equation which is exactly the same as if we assume that initial total 
productivity level Ai(0) is identical across countries, that every country is at the frontier (bi = 
1) and that there is no long term TFP-growth differences (ci = 0). The growth process is 
therefore the result of four distinct forces: the ―adjusted‖ absolute convergence – the 
convergence is lessened here because of overall productivity level differences, hence the 
adjective ―adjusted‖, a second convergence component coming from technological catch-up, 
the usual non-convergence stemming from differences in long term paths due to different 
investment rates, and an additional divergence force coming from long term TFP-growth 
differences. 
Boulhol considers the similar levels of technology in each country because it is difficult to 
scrutinize the differences that are there. 
Equation (6) shows that there is the relative level of initial productivity. From (6) and (7), the 
speed of convergence can be computed and the contribution of institutionalised technology 
can be screened out therefrom. A part η of initial income ratios can be explained by initial 
productivity ratios, the complement 1 – η being explained by capital differences, and 
therefore: 
8a. 
𝒂𝒊 𝟎 ≡
𝑨𝒊 𝟎 
𝑨𝒃𝒆𝒏 𝟎 
=  
𝒚𝒊 𝟎 
𝒚𝒃𝒆𝒏 𝟎 
 
𝜼
   
 
8b. 
𝛈 =  
𝑪𝒐𝒗 (𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝒂𝒊 𝟎  , 𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝒚 𝟎  )
𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝒚𝒊 𝟎  )
 
 
Estimates of stocks of physical and human capital to infer productivity levels can be made 
and it can be assessed that productivity differences account for half or more of level 
differences. Since productivity is born out of institutions, and enhanced by technology 
(resources and capital included), it can be safely assumed that institutions lead to growth and 
eventual economic convergence in a country. According to equation (2), with η and  a = b = 
1/ 3 , the output per capita ratio between the two countries (out of which one might be the 
benchmark country) is explained by the impact of the productivity level ratio and a capital 
aggregate, Z
KH
. For sure, the extreme simplification in equation (8), which has the merit of 
highlighting the potential correlation between initial productivity and initial output per 
worker, as well as the comparison of how efficient an institution might be and its reflection 
on the corresponding level of economic growth pattern, shows how countries fare in the 
presence of institutions (i.e. how the institutions impact long term behaviour of the economy). 
(Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997)) 
 
WEAK INSTRUMENTS TEST 
Post estimation Test: depvar indepvar (endogenous variable = instrument) 
 Endogeneity Test: estat endog  
Ho:  variables are exogenous 
If P value is very small, then reject null hypothesis 
 
 Weak Instrument Test: estat firststage, all forcenonrobust 
Ho: instruments are weak. 
Partial R-squared measures the endogenous variable and the instrument after we 
partialling out exogenous variable, if high and if F-statistic has to be the large, then to 
reject the null hypothesis. 
Partial R-sq. in the table in Stata shows that post partialling correlation 
 Over Identification Test: estat overid 
Ho: instrument set is valid and model is correctly specified. 
If P value for Sargan and Basman tests are large, then the null is correct. 
We use the Weak Instrument Test. 
The Weak Instrument Test 
The general trend in the weak instrument test is what we expect out an AJR paper: weak 
instruments, but significant enough to prove a point. For the weak instrument test (see the do 
file), we took the three instruments that we have: logsm, lpd1500, logmal and euros.  
For logsm, the instruments are weak, as we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Partial R2 is 
low, and so is the F-statistic, which proves the weakness in logsm as an instrument. The 
minimum eigenvalue statistic is equal to the F-statistic where its magnitude determines 
whether we accept or reject the null. The Executive Constraint proxy shows the minimum F-
statistic in our analysis, while the strongest one is Government Effectiveness. lpd1500 is used 
for two sections: AJR and Sachs. AJR never really uses this, but we use this to explore the 
concept we are dealing with. For AJR, the pattern is similar. However, the noticeable thing is 
the magnitude of the F-statistics. The values are extremely low in nature, far weaker than 
logsm, which probably explains its results. The minimum value of F-statistics is availed from 
the Control on Corruption proxy. For AJR, we always have used latitude (distance from the 
equator), as the exogenous variable and the proxy for geography. However, for Sachs‘ paper, 
things get more exciting. We run the regressions on not one, but two proxies of geography – 
distance from the coast and malaria ecology. Running the same test on Sachs‘ results would 
yield us the same answer, both for lpd1500 and for the lesser used logsm. It is inferred that 
this is a marked weak instrument. When regressed with proxies like distance from the coast 
and malaria ecology, Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, 
and Voice and Accountability, have returned decent numbers, which enabled us to reject the 
null hypothesis of weak instruments. Regressions on Albouy‘s paper returned similar results 
like Acemoglu indicated which again proves how he does almost the same thing AJR. 
Government Effectiveness and Executive Constraints have the highest and lowest values 
again, respectively, when logmal is used as an instrument. This proves that like logsm, 
logmal – derived from Albouy‘s revised set – is as much a weak instrument. We have 
extended Easterly-Levine‘s idea by incorporating IV regressions in our analysis (which we 
can see using the endogeneity test – whether or not it is at all necessary. We have not 
discussed about the endogeneity test in this context). By taking the euros as an instrument, we 
find that the F-statistic is small in every which regression, thus implying the euros is a weak 
instrument too. Since we do not use euros as an instrument anywhere else, we check for weak 
instrumentation only when we discuss Easterly-Levine‘s ideas extending from their analysis.  
The critical values shown in the table is used to test whether or not we reject the null 
hypothesis. Some values are significant at 5%, some at 10%, some at 15%, and so on. 
However, the generic trend, with some fluctuations obviously, shows that the instruments 
used are weak instruments. 
 
 
 
 
